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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
tiable Instruments Law) nevertheless decided that such a signer is
one of the "general class, kind, or nature known as sureties or guar-
antors" specifically enumerated in the Act and is therefore included
in the "others subject to the obligation or liability" mentioned therein.
The position taken in the Akron and Zaentz cases is a sound one.
Even if we assume that co-makers are excluded from the immunities
of "sureties, guarantors and endorsers", they would still be among
"the others subject to the obligation or liability" entitled to the
protection .of a stay.
Perhaps the only failing in the Act itself lies in its maximum
time limit of three months after termination of military service for
suspension of liabilities. It is highly unrealistic to assume that a
man just released from the army, who has been receiving about $30
a month while in service, will be able to cam sufficient money in three
months to discharge an indebtedness which has accumulated over a
period of years. No other similar statute gives such inadequate
protection.3 5
Amendment of the Act in this regard, accompanied by a more
liberal interpretation of its provisions in the courts, would more





A promise made upon a past or executed consideration, if the
promise is in writing and signed by the promisor, and if the writing
expresses the consideration and if the consideration was actually given
or performed and would be a valid consideration if it were not for the
time when it was given or performed, shall not be denied effect as a
valid contractual obligation.'
An assignment for which there was not any consideration shall
not be denied the effect of irrevocably transferring the assignor's in-
terests if in writing and signed by the assignor.2
An offer of contract, which states that it is irrevocable and which
is made in a writing signed by the offeror, has been made irrevocable
35 Australia allows six months, Alberta and Saskatchewan two years.
Great Britain and Manitoba set no limit, leaving the matter to judicial dis-
cretion in each case.
IN. Y. PES. PROP. LAW § 33(3) and N. Y. REAL PRop. LAW § 279(2)
(both eff. Sept. 1, 1941).2 N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 33(4) and N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 279(3)
(both eff. Sept. 1, 1941).
[ VOL. 16
CURRENT LEGISLATION
even though there was not any consideration, and the irrevocability
will continue during the time stated in the offer, although, if no time
is stated, the irrevocability will endure for a reasonable time.3
These three items of legislation were proposed by the Law Re-
vision Commission.4 It appears from the Report of the Commission
that the three enactments are a part of what resulted from the Com-
mission's study since 1934 of the law concerning the seal, and that
they are intended to cause a writing, bearing no seal, to accomplish
what a sealed writing in each case would have accomplished formerly.P
B. The Provision Relating to Past Consideration
The provision relating to past consideration is said to be in
derogation of the common law in many respects.6 The Studies of
the Law Revision Commission 7 trace the history of consideration
from the common law of debt, through assumpsit, to the present day,
and not only in the common law, but in equity and law merchant
(value) as well. Note is taken of Slade's case, 8 whereafter debts
could be recovered in assumpsit whether there had been a promise or
not, and of the great work of Ames, 9 who demonstrated that at a time
about sixty years before Slade's case in 1603, subsequent promises to
pay precedent debts began to be enforceable at common law, orig-
inally in indebitatus assumpsit, in order to permit assumpsit to lie
so that wager of law (were the plaintiff limited to the writ of debt)
might be obviated.10
Even the scholarship which the Commission put into its Studies
can hardly change the fact that "past consideration" is involved either
in a promise to pay a precedent debt, or in a promise to pay when
there was not a precedent debt. If the provision relates only to the
former, it is at least generally not in derogaton of the common law."
If it relates to the latter, there are many respects in which again it
3 N. Y. Pans. PROP. LAW § 33(5) and N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 279(4)(both eff. Sept. 1, 1941).
4N. Y. LAW REvisioN CommissroN, Leg. Doc. (1941) No. 65(M) pp.
10-20.5 N. Y. LAw REvisION ColmissioN, Leg. Doc. (1941) No. 65(M) pp.
1-70; Leg. Doc. (1936) No. 65(C) and 65(D) pp. 1-293.6 N. Y. LAw REvsroIN CommissroN, Leg. Doc. (1941) No. 65(M) pp.
1-70, partic. pp. 51, 52, 54, 55; Leg. Doc. (1936) Nos. 65(C) and 65(D) pp.
1-293, partic. pp. 27-92 and pp. 192-206.
7Ibid.
8 4 Coke 92b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (1603).
9 Ames, History of Assztmpsit (1888) 2 HAIv. L. REv. 1-19, 53-69.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid. See also notes 6 and 9, supra; Wnu~isTox, CoNTRACTS § 143,
wherein, while contending that the subsequent promise adds nothing, Mr.
Williston concedes that in the United States the declaration could be upon the
subsequent promise at least as long as the writs lasted. See also §§ 144 and
146; WHITNEY, CONTRAcTS § 53(h).
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is not in derogation,' 2 so that it is doubtful if we need the enactment,
except to accomplish a clarification which has perhaps not been ac-
complished at all, as will be shown. For example, it is difficult to
see desirability in the rendering enforceable of subsequent written
promises to pay for what were gratuities such as gifts and acts of kind-
ness when given or done. Yet this has indeed been accomplished un-
less the words "would be a valid consideration but for the time when
it was given or performed" are construed to have some other meaning.
Of course, nothing in the Studies of the Commission indicates an in-
tention or expectation that the construction will include any such
giving of force to promises to make some payment or performance in
exchange for executed gratuities. On the contrary, the Commission
says: "Without undertaking to enforce all promises and agreements,
the common law might conceivably establish a more comprehensive
basis or theory for the enforcement of deliberate promises intention-
ally made where they are of a character ordinarily relied upon by
men in their economic or business dealings. The necessary delibera-
tion, certainty and security could be insured by evidentiary and for-
mal requirements." Is
What, then, will the provision be held to cover? We do not
need it when the subsequent promise merely recreates a remedial
right, barred by the Statute of Limitations' 4 or by discharge in
bankruptcy '5 or by infancy,' 6 upon a primary obligation or debt
(miscalled by Mansfield a "moral" obligation)1 7 which had never been
discharged. We do not seem to need it if there was precedent debt
even though the remedy is not barred,' 8 and in many cases based
upon principles of the common law as distinguished from equity (or
12 See notes 6 and 9, supra.
13 N. Y. LAW RFViSlON" CommissioN, Leg. Doc. (1936) No. 65(D) p.
92 (part of an article by Mr. Horace E. Whiteside, of the Cornell Law
Faculty).
'4 Serrell v. Forbes, 106 App. Div. 482, 94 N. Y. Supp. 805 (1905), aff'd,
185 N. Y. 572, 78 N. E. 112 (1906) ; Fletcher v. Daniels, 52 App. Div. 482,
94 N. Y. Supp. 805 (1905) ; see also N. Y. LAW REVISION CoMMIssIoN, Leg.
Doc. (1936) No. 65(D) pp. 35, 36, 64.
'15 N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAw § 31; Herrington v. Davitt, 220 N. Y. 162, 115
N. E. 476 (1917); see also N. Y. LAW REVISION COmmissioN, Leg. Doc.
(1936) No. 65(D) pp. 35, 36, 64.
16 Casey v. Kastel, 237 N. Y. 305, 142 N. E. 671 (1924) ; Halsey v. Reed,
4 Hun 777 (N. Y. 1875) Henry v. Root, 33 N. Y. 526 (1865); see also N. Y.
LAW REvis ON CoMMIssION, Leg. Doc. (1936) No. 65(D) pp. 35, 36, 64.
1 N. Y. LAW REvISION CoMMISSION, Leg. Doc. (1936) No. 65(D) pp.
35-37, 64, citing Holdsworth, The Modern History of Consideration (1922) 2
B. U. L. REv. 87, 174 and other works of Holdsworth. They might also have
cited extensively from HoHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (1923).
's Matter of Bradbury, 105 App. Div. 250, 93 N. Y. Supp. 418 (1905);
Matter of Todd's Estate, 47 Misc. 35, 95 N. Y. Supp. 211 (1905) ; Yarwood v.
Trusts & Guarantee Co., 94 App. Div. 47,-87 N. Y. Supp. 947; Hicks v.
Burhans, 10 Johns. 243 (N. Y. 1813) ; WrITNEY, CONTRACTS § 49; WiLLISTOx,




upon the common law with merely some influence from equity or law
merchant or both), we do not need the provision even though there
was not a precedent obligation,19 if the special nature of the promises
makes their enforceability desirable nevertheless. These include prom-
ises to waive conditions such as those relating to architects' certifi-
cates, the liability of endorsers and drawers of negotiable paper and
of guarantors, letters of credit, stipulations of counsel, a promise by a
parent that his child shall have his earnings free from interference by
the parent, promises undertaken in connection with bailments, 20 and
"9 Drake v. Bell, 26 Misc. 945, 55 N. Y. Supp. 945 (1899); Willetts v.
The Sun Mutual Ins. Co., 45 N. Y. 45, 6 Am. Rep. 31 (1871); Hicks v. Bur-
hans, 10 Johns. 243 (N. Y. 1813).20N. Y. LAw RE isiON CommIssioN, Leg. Doc. (1936) No. 65(D) pp.
68-70. Gratuitous undertakings in connection with a bailment deserve special
note, because they require reminder of a component of consideration theory not
mentioned in the extended discussion of the various theories in either the 1936
or the 1941 Studies of the Commission, and also because after the mention of
Siegel v. Spear, 2.34 N. Y. 479, 138 N. E. 414 (1923) in the 1936 Study (p. 70),
Comfort v. McCorkle, 149 Misc. 826, 268 N. Y. Supp. 192 (1933), was brought
to the Commission's attention by. Mr. Hays of the Columbia Law School
Faculty, who prepared the Commission's Study for 1941 (Leg. Doc. [1941]
No. 65[M] pp. 23-58).
Can it not be, as suggested by Messrs. Edgar, Sr. and Jr., in their WORK-
BooK IN BAI LENTS, INNKEEPERS AND CARRIERS (1941) p. 51, that, among
other things, consideration for an executory promise made at arms' length is a
substitute for the element of trust exemplified by that transfer of possession
which is the operative fact creating the jural relationship of bailment as dis-
tinguished from contract? And which is further exemplified by the power in
trust which is the essence of the jural relationship of principal and agent as
distinguished from contract? Bailment and agency would seem properly called
"trusts cognizable at law." The persons who have status in them are not at
arms' length. When, between persons dealing at arms' length a promise is
passed, perhaps it is the consideration for that promise which takes away the
arms' length quality in the transaction and brings breach of the promise nearer
to being the breach of a trust. The trust element in special relationships has
been recognized a's the basis for their enforcement. It was said to be so
expressly in Ridgers v. Lucet, 2 Johns. Cas. 92 (N. Y. 1800), and in the Siegel
case itself. The opinion in the Siegel case pointed to the fact that in Thorne
v. Deas, 4 Johns. 84 (N. Y. 1809), _possession had not passed, so that no trust
was constituted, and this was given as the reason for the judicial refusal in
that case to recognize obligation as existing therein.
As for Comfort v. McCorkle, it does nothing except follow the historic
common sense which underlies Thorne v. Deas. In both cases there was nothing
to constitute a trust, and the "promissory estoppel" which Mr. Hays suggests
in the 1942 Study of the Commission (p. 50) as a reason for a contrary result
should depend for its justification upon something more reasonable than that
the promisee, trusting the promisor in fact, relied upon the promise. There is
always the question of his being entitled so to rely in a world of careless prom-
ising and casual forgetting. This seems also to be a satisfactory justification
for the other cases deprecated by Mr. Hays in the 1941 Study at pages 51, 52, 54
and 55, and some of them (e.g, Pershall v. Elliott. 249 N. Y. 183. 163 N. E. 654
[19281 and McDevitt v. Stokes, 174 Ky. 515, 192 S. W. 681 [19171) are probably
not within the operative language of the statute in any event. In the Pershall
case, the promisee was not the person who had extended the "past considera-
tion." In the McDevitt case, the "past consideration" consisted of an obligation
already owed to a third person.
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probably charitable subscriptions, and the Commission says that this
list is probably not exhaustive.2 1
The Commission credits additional items to equity,22 and notes
that they are declarations of trust by a chattel owner, undertakings
to hold real property in trust, and promises (for viewed realistically
that is all they are) to make gifts when the form the promise takes is
other than mere promise, and to make gifts of land by deed though
no deed has been given (if the donee is in possession and has acted
on the gift as by the making of improvements), undertakings im-
perfectly executed particularly when they are to a creditor for se-
curity or to a wife by way of settlement or to a child by way of
advancement.
What then is left?
The marriage settlement? These have been well handled by the
decisional law.23
Promises not to exercise a power of avoidance based on other
grounds than infancy? These, like promises not to avoid the power
based on infancy, are a present consideration.
2 4
Promises by A and B to C that A and B will not mutually give
up a contract between them? These, too, are a present considera-
tion.2 5
Promises to do for one person what one is already bound to do
for another? Let us pass the question of whether or not these are
commonly enough thought of as invalid because of some connection
with "past consideration" or for some other reason not so much re-
lated to time. Let us, in other words, except to express a doubt, pass
the question of whether or not the words "would be a valid consid-
eration but for the time when it was given or performed" will be
construed to include "would be a valid consideration but for the fact
that it had previously been promised to a different promisee." Is
the matter important enough to have a whole new enactment about?
Particularly one which is not phrased broadly enough to cover the
strong doubt as to its inclusion? Assume that the enactment is con-
strued so as to include these cases: What more will be proved to
have been accomplished by the enactment than to repeat what was
decided by the Court of Appeals in De Cicco v. Schweitzer? 2 6 The
same comment can be made upon Arend v. Smith.2 7 In that case,
21 N. Y. LAW REVIs oN CoMMissioN, Leg. Doc. (1936) No. 65(D) p. 70.
2 2 N. Y. LAw REvis oN CoMMIssioI, Leg. Doc. (1936) No. 65(D) pp.
69-71, 73.
23 De Cicco v. Schweitzer, 221 N. Y. 431, 117 N. E. 807 (1917) ; Phalen v.
U. S. Trust Co., 186 N. Y. 178, 78 N. E. 943 (1906).24 WI USTONr, CONTRACTS §§ 151-154.
25 De Cicco v. Schweitzer, 221 N. Y. 431, 117 N. E. 807 (1917); see
Williston, Successive Promises of the Same Performance (1894) 8 HARv. L.
REV. 27.
26221 N. Y. 431, 117 N. E. 807 (1917).
27 151 N. Y. 502, 45 N. E. 872 (1897).
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A was indebted to B Corporation, and C, the president of B Corpo-
ration, procured A to pay his debt by giving a note to B Corporation
on C's endorsement of it and C's promise to renew or procure its re-
newal at maturity. When, at maturity, C having paid the note to B
Corporation sued A, the promise respecting the renewal was held not
to be a defense (to an action on the note) for want of consideration
for, the promise. However, considering arguendo that fairness and
our economic society would both have been better served by a con-
trary result, it must again be asked, on the same basis as it was asked
earlier in this paragraph, "Does the enactment under discussion pro-
vide for that result?" Moreover, the Commission itself hints that
the De Cicco case overrules the Arend case, 28 and if, as the Com-
mission continues,29 there is still doubt nevertheless, the Commission
ought to have framed a recommended enactment which would not
have left the matter in doubt.
The Commission admits that the courts have been astute enough
to find consideration in meritorious cases of promises by third per-
sons to induce one already under contract with another to perform
his contract "despite the applicability of the general rule that a pre-
existing duty defeats consideration". 80 The very objections to the
De Cicco opinion of which the Commission complains 8 1 evidence
the astuteness of which the Commission writes.
The past consideration enactment does not seem to have been
necessary in respect to consideration for the promises of notes, as
will be shown. Special factors require separate treatment of this
problem, one of them being the considerable discussion by Mr.
Whiteside in the Studies of the Commission.8 2
The need for consideration was unknown at law merchant.83
This is not contradicted in any subsequent case, according to Judge
Cranch.84  Professor Ames thought that the whole doctrine of con-
sideration in the law of commercial paper was a modem innovation85
28 X. Y. LAw R Wlsio Coiumissio, Leg. Doe. (1936) No. 65(D) pp.
45, 46.29 Id. at p. 46.
30 Id. at p. 206.
31 Id. at p. 46.
82 Id. at pp. 74-79, with their extensive documentation.
83 Pillans v. Van Mierop, 3 Burr. 166, 97 Eng. Rep. 1035 (1765).
34 Cranch, Promissory Notes (1801). This article by Judge Cranch was
originally an opinion by him in Dunlop v. Silver, 1 Cr. C. C. 27, Fed. Cas. 4169
(1801), contra to Mandeville v. Riddle, 1 Cranch (5 U. S.) 290, 2 L. ed. 112
(1803). When, as reporter of 1 Cranch, he compiled the volume containing
the Mandeville case, he rearranged his opinion into an article (it is the most
thorough consideration ever given to the cases in the English reports daring
the absorption of law merchant, and covers all of them), and inserted it as an
appendix to the volume, where it appears at page 368 (2 L. ed. 139). In part
it has been duplicated in 3 Snrxcr EssAys IN ANGLO-AmECAx LEGAL HisTORny(1909) 72. Blackstone agreed that consideration was not required at law
merchant (2 BL" Com. 446), although his choice of documentation is unfor-
tunate.
85 AEms, CAsEs ox BILLS AND NoTEs (1881) 872-876. Here Professor
1942]
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If, however, notes were not negotiable at law merchant, these views
did not include notes. Thus the question of whether or not collateral
security for an antecedent debt is sufficient "consideration" for the
promise of a note very largely depends on whether or not they were
negotiable instruments at law merchant. Lord Holt held that they
were not, in Buller v. Crips.3 6 As a result it has been said that they
were not negotiable until the statute of Anne,3 7 which is an error 38
early made,3 9 and found repeated in modem writings, 40 as Judge
Cranch has shown.41
At any rate, Buller v. Crips did lead to the statute of Anne,
which had the result of restoring the law as it existed before Buller
v. Crips.
42
There has not been any doubt of the negotiability of promissory
notes, and of the appurtenance to them of all the incidents of nego-
tiable instruments, if they are in proper form, since that enactment.
In New York we followed England's course and by statute 43
accomplished for ourselves what the statute of Anne had brought
about over there.44
Ames makes the point which was the basis of Lord Holt's objections to these
instruments, that notes are specialties and are effective by the mere fact of
their formal execution; in other words, that they symbolize property and not
contract, having transformed into the former the promise of the latter. See also
Carnright v. Gray, 127 N. Y. 92, 27 N. E. 835 (1891).
36 1 Salk. 130, 91 Eng. Rep. 123 (1704). This most important case, under
the name Buller v. Crips, first appears in the law reports at an earlier term of
King's Bench in the same year in 6 Mod. 29, 87 Eng. Rep. 793. "And the court
at last took the vacation to consider of it." It never appears again under the
same name, and this led even such a thorough scholar as Judge Cranch (1
Cranch 416, 417, 2 L. ed. 158, 159), to say that no case was ever decided which
held that a promissory note was not a negotiable instrument. It did, however,
appear in the Trinity Term, at the citations first given above, under the name
Butler v. Grips, where the decision against negotiability is to be found, as
Messrs. Edgar, Sr. and Jr. have shown in their CAsES ON BILLS AND NoTEs
(1939) 10.
37 3 & 4 Anne, c. 9, 1704-5.
38 See note 41, infra.
39 It is first found in the headnote of the second report of the Buller case,
under the name of Butler v. Crps.
40 7 Am. Jur. 795, 796.
41 This is the burden of Judge Cranch's work (supra, note 34). He cites
many cases before the statute of Anne in which notes were held negotiable
under the customs of merchants, in some of which Lord Holt himself had sat,
and reminds us that Malynes in his LEx MFscAroI.m wrote on the use of notes
in England, and that the work of Malynes was published in 1622. Judge
Cranch points to a note case of 1586, and continues by showing that only four
cases prior to Buller v. Crips doubted the negotiability of notes, that Lord Holt
was responsible for all of the doubts, and that his dislike of notes was based
on their being specialties without seals. Thus the discovery that Butler v. Crips
was in the end actually decided against negotiability can be seen for its impor-
tance, in that it did make necessary the statute of Anne.
42 1 Cranch (5 U.-S.) 418-459, 2 L. ed. 159-177.
43 N. Y. 1 REv. STAT. 768 (1788); Carnright v. Gray, 127 N. Y. 92, 27
N. E. 835 (1891) ; 1 Cranch (5 U. S.) 460, 2 L. ed. 177.
44 Carnright v. Gray, 127 N'. Y. 92, 27 N. E. 835 (1891) ; 1 Cranch (5
U. S.) 460, 2 L. ed. 177.
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How, then, does it happen that there is any requirement for
anything even resembling consideration to be the basis for the en-
forceability of the promise of a note? 45
In Pillans v. Van Mierop,46 some of the judges said that con-
sideration was necessary only in the case of "parol" obligations. The
truth of this was later denied by the House of Lords in Rann v.
Hughes.4 7 If 'the statements in the Pillans case had been confined
to the law merchant instrument involved in the case, the House of
Lords would not have mistaken the reference to "parol" as having
been intended to be synonymous with "oral", and probably would
never have uttered the merely seeming repudiation of the Pillans case
in Rann v. Hughes, which did not involve a note or other law mer-
chant instrument.
In spite of this mischance, it is nevertheless certain in England
that collateral security for a precedent debt furnishes sufficient "con-
sideration" for the promise in a note, in an action between maker and
payee,4 8 in spite of Rann v. Hughes.
It is clear, therefore, that the absence of need for consideration,
which was the state of the law before Buller v. Crips, the statute of
Anne and Rann v. Hughes, has not been changed to such a degree
as to make collateral security for a pre-existing debt insufficient
"consideration" for the promise in a note.49
45 That there is a requirement for consideration or something very like it
is undoubted. N. Y. LAw REvisioN CommissioN, Leg. Doc. (1936) No. 65(D)
pp. 72-79 (Mr. Whiteside); WILLIsioN, CoNTRAcrs §§ 108, 1146.
46 3 Burr. 166, 97 Eng. Rep. 1035 (1765). In this case it was held that
there was no need for consideration in law merchant transactions.
47 7 T. R. 350a, 101 Eng. Rep. 1014a (1764).
48 After some vacillation (cf. Sison v. Kidman, 11 L. J. C. P. 100, 133
Eng. Rep. 1365 [1842], pro, and Crofts v. Beale, 20 L. J. C. P. 186, 138 Eng.
Rep. 436 [1851], contra), the English courts settled down to the doctrine in a
case involving a bill of exchange in 1876. Currie v. Misa, L. R. 10 Ex. 151,
44 L. J. Ex. 94, aff'd on another ground in the House of Lords, 1 App. Cas. 554,
45 L. J. Q. B. 852, and the rule of that case was followed in an action between
payee and maker of a note in 1883. Stott v. Fairlamb, 53 L. J. Q. B. 47,
49 L. T. 525 C. A.
49In re Ranlett's Estate, 118 Misc. 528, 193 N. Y. Supp. 639 (1922);
Bigelow Co. v. Automatic Gas Producer Co., 56 Misc. 389, 107 N. Y. Supp.
894 (1907); Lake v. Tysen, 6 N. Y. 461 (1852). In re Ranlett's Estate
involved a claim upon a note given for a past indebtedness upon the clearest
possible facts. The defendant was the maker-debtor. The plaintiff was the
creditor-payee. The plaintiff succeeded. The note was obviously given as mere
security though the account was marked "discharged." In the Bigelow case,
services had already been rendered by the plaintiff-payee to the defendant-maker
when the note was made. The plaintiff recovered. - The court said, in passing,
that the notes were in "payment," but no particular significance was attached
to the word, which was used off-handedly and not in contradistinction to the
security notion or function. In the Lake case, a note was given upon the
"settlement" of something very like an account of past due items owed betwveen
the parties. The plaintiff payee-creditor succeeded in his action against the
defendant maker-debtor. No facts showed discharge of the precedent indebt-
edness. The circumstances of these cases do not constitute discharge, but
security merely, for the payee may recover upon the original indebtedness by
1942 ]
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In the light of the foregoing, it is difficult to imagine the defeat
of a plaintiff in an action upon a negotiable note which he received
from a maker already obligated to him upon an indebtedness, when
the motive and purpose of the transaction were to secure the credi-
tor's debt, as by making proof less difficult and risky, or to enable the
creditor to have a symbol by which to raise cash by discount, par-
ticularly if he did discount the note and, upon the maker's dishonor,
has had to take it up for honor. When one considers the conjunction
of five facts, the need for the past consideration statute under dis-
cussion seems to disappear: (a) New York was, after all, a state
whose decisional law 5 0 reached the conclusion that security for a
precedent debt was value in a transfer; that such security is suffi-
cient "consideration" follows as a probability; (b) there is a dearth
of cases holding that security for a precedent debt is not "considera-
tion" enough to support an action upon the promise of a note; (c) at
one time there was no requirement at all for consideration for the
promises of notes, and a mere accident led to the partial institution
of the requirement as a very modem innovation; (d) New York's
statute 51 is the equivalent of the statute of Anne after which it be-
came settled in the English law that security for a precedent debt
validates the promise of a note; and (e) New York's existing deci-
sional law points all but conclusively to the same result.
C. The Provision Relating to Gratuitous Assignments
The provision declaring the validity of an unsealed but written
and signed assignment without consideration is generally declaratory
of the decisional law and equity,52 although before the enactment a
gratuitous assignment was subject to revocation,58 whose legal con-
sequence, when the fact of the revocation had been communicated to
offering up the note. Hilderbrandt v. Fallot, 46 Misc. 615, 92 N. Y. Supp. 804(1905); Hughes v. Wheeler, 8 Cow. 77 (N. Y. 1827); Pintard v. Tackington,
10 Johns. 103 (N. Y. 1813); Holmes and Drake v. De Camp, 1 Johns. 33
(N. Y. 1806) ; see also Webster v. Laurence, 13 Hun 180 (N. Y. 1878). State-
ments expressed or implied in cases such as these that the note is only evidence
are, of course, belied by those cases in which the plaintiffs succeed in actions on
the notes themselves.
50 Continental Nat. Bank v. Townsend, 87 N. Y. 8 (1881) ; Grocers Bank
v. Penfield, 69 N. Y. 502 (1877). The Court of Appeals, which said in Kelso
v. Ellis, 224 N . Y. 528, 121 N. E. 364 (1918), that the uniform act had brought
to New York the recognition of antecedent debt as value, seems to have over-
looked these two cases, as pointed out by the Messrs. Edgar, Sr. and Jr., in
their BILLs AxD NoTEs (1935) at page 73. The Law Revision Commission
apparently agrees (Leg. Doc. [1936] No. 65[D] p. 75), for they, too, refer to
these two cases as reflecting the New York law. Mr. Williston, also, seems to
have overlooked them. W SuTSrON, CONMAcS §§ 108, 1146, nn. 65 and 69.
s N. Y. 1 REv. STAT. 768 (1788).
52N. Y. LAw REvisIoN CommIssIoN, Leg. Doc. (1941) No. 65(M) p. 55;
Leg. Doc. (1936) No. 65(D) pp. 272-274.53 WMLISTON, CoNT.Acrs § 438; Alger v. Scott, 54 N. Y. 14 (1873).
[ VOL. 16
CURRENT LEGISLATION
the assignor, was to redirect the obligation to the assignor to the
extent that the obligor had not already acted upon the assignment by
performing to and for the assignee.54 Hence the chief consequence of
this enactment in the future will be to dissolve the subjection to revo-
cation under which a gratuitous assignment labored. 55 Thus a gratu-
itous assignment, when in writing and signed, becomes as irrevocable
as does a written and signed offer which purports to be irrevocable.
We are tending to make the law of property complete, in this case
by perfecting the power of disposition.
D. The Provision Relating to the Irrevocability of Offers
As to the provision which creates the irrevocability of offers in
certain cases: It is in derogation of the common law."
Much has been written in the periodicals of the past year con-
cerning the provision noted herein,5 7 but the Commission's Reports
for 1936 and 1941 are more significant, both generally and in par-
ticular connection with the enactment concerning irrevocability and
its relation to the seal.
The Commission in its 1941 report and the law review com-
mentators are nearly unanimous in their references to Cochran v.
Taylor ;8 (decided a year after the Commission's original report of
its study) and in their quotation of a remark from the court's opin-
ion by Judge Rippey that modern business necessitates more force-
fully than ever that a seal create an estoppel to deny consideration. 9
The commentators, Mr. Hays and Mr. Glendening, are critical of the
statement. The latter goes so far as to call it "astonishing". In sup-
port of himself, however, Judge Rippey cited Mr. Wiliston.60  His-
tory seems to support Judge Rippey, as Mr. Hays himself, writing
for the Commission, has noted,& and its report shows clearly that it
is indebted to the court for pointing out the historical error 62 in
which the Commission itself once participated,6 and which led to the
54 See note 53, supra.
55 Here we have gone further than does law merchant, for negotiation
requires value to support it, while this enactment is satisfied by an informal
signed document of transfer without more.56 Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R. v. Columbus Rolling Mill, 119 U. S. 149,
30 L. ed. 376 (1886) ; WHiNEY, CoNxTAcrs § 34.
57 Glendening, Jr., Developments in the Law of Seal and Consideration in
New York (1941) 26 CoRer. L. Q. 692; Hays, Formal Contracts and Considera-
tion: A Legislative Program (1941) 41 COL. L. Ray. 849.
58 273 N. Y. 172, 7 N. E. (2d) 89 (1937).
59 273 N. Y. 172, 179, 7 N. E. (2d) 89, 91 (1937).60 WmLisT N, CoNTRAcrs § 219.
61 N. Y. LAW RmISIo CommissoN, Leg. Doe. (1941) No. 65(M) pp.
27, 28.62 1bid.
63Id. at pp. 23-28; Leg. Doe. (1936) No. 65(D) pp. 5-13.
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phrasing of former Section 342 of the Civil Practice Act, 64 so that,
in the light of the Cochran case, the former section was seen to ac-
complish nothing. Consequently, as part of its work in 1941, the
Commission was able to recommend the present wording of that
section. 65
Furthermore, because what the Court of Appeals held in the
Cochran case was that a sealed option reciting a consideration is ir-
revocable during the period stated in the option, judge Rippey's ob-
servation can be seen to be neither untrue nor "astonishing", for,
though he wrote in terms of a sealed offer of option, he was merely
stating the very basis of the Commission's 1941 recommendation,
namely, that there is need for the device of an enforceable option with-
out a requirement for consideration. The fact that the enactment
extends this quality of enforceability to an unsealed but signed writ-
ing indicates how strongly the Commission and the legislature agree
with Judge Rippey's actual meaning.
Indeed, the extension of potential irrevocability to unsealed writ-
ings is, in the light of the Cochran case, the entire accomplishment
of the statute, which can thus be seen to have done no more than
cancel out the necessity for the letters "L.S." or a piece of red paper,
as the red paper once cancelled out the need for a drop of molten wax.
E. Conclusion
In conclusion, it should be pointed out that the second and third
of the provisions under discussion, like the enactment validating deeds
to lands adversely possessed against the grantor 66 and the statute
taking away the power of avoidance in certain cases of business con-
tracts of minors 67 adopted at the same legislative session which
enacted the provisions noted here, constitute necessary recognition of
the fact that great need exists for bringing the law of property and of
trade more into line with behavior in trade and about property.
64 Formerly read: "1. A seal upon a written instrument hereafter executed
shall not be received as conclusive or presumptive evidence of consideration. A
written instrument, hereafter executed, which changes or modifies or which
discharges in whole or in part a sealed instrument shall not be deemed invalid
or ineffectual because of the absence of a seal thereon. A sealed instrument
may not be changed, modified or discharged by an excutory agreement unless
such agreement is in writing and signed by the party against whom it is sought
to enforce the change, modification or discharge. A sealed instrument so
changed or modified shall continue to be construed as an instrument under seal."
65 N . Y. LAw RmsioN ComlissioN, Leg. Doe. (1941) No. 65(M) pp. 3,
23-28. So that the Act now reads: "Except as otherwise expressly provided
by statute, the presence or absence of a seal upon a written instrument hereafter
executed shall be without legal effect."
66N . Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 260, noted in (1941) 16 ST. JoHN's L. IEv.
150. 6




However, since it seems that without the enactment relating to
past consideration our law already contains all that is necessary to the
world of trade and property of what the Commission says is desir-
able,68 and, since its wording creates doubt that it can be held to
accomplish more than to fix in our law some of the necessary ex-
pedients already there (unless it be construed to include others not
desirable), its virtue must lie in that it gives to hand the means of
dealing with some unknown problem of the future. This seems hardly
a sufficient basis for running the risk of the drawbacks which inhere
in the enactment, in the light of the general flexibility, and hence,
efficiency, of the common law.
L. DEL VEccHIO.
68 N. Y. LAw REVISION COMmISSION, Leg. Doc. (1936) No. 65(D) p. 92.
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